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Unlike acute pain that warns us of injury or disease, chronic or persistent pain serves no 
adaptive purpose. Though there is no agreed on definition of chronic pain, it is commonly 
referred to as pain that is without biological value, lasting longer than the typical healing 
time, not responsive to treatments based on specific remedies, and of a duration greater 
than 6 months. Chronic pain that is severe and intractable has detrimental consequences, 
including psychological distress, job loss, social isolation, and, not surprisingly, it is highly 
comorbid with depression and anxiety. Historically, pain without an apparent anatomical or 
neurophysiological origin was labelled as psychopathological. This approach is damaging 
to the patient and provider alike. It pollutes the therapeutic relationship by introducing an 
element of mutual distrust as well as implicit, if not explicit, blame. It is demoralizing to the 
patient who feels at fault, disbelieved, and alone. Moreover, many medically unexplained 
pains are now understood to involve an interplay between peripheral and central 
neurophysiological mechanisms that have gone awry. The new Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition, somatic symptom disorder overpsychologizes 
people with chronic pain; it has low sensitivity and specificity, and it contributes to 
misdiagnosis, as well as unnecessary stigma. Adjustment disorder remains the most 
appropriate, accurate, and acceptable diagnosis for people who are overly concerned about 
their pain.
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Abbreviations
CIDI Composite International Diagnostic Interview
CNS central nervous system
DSM Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
IASP International Association for the Study of Pain
OR odds ratio
PTSD posttraumatic stress disorder
SSD somatic symptom disorder
Highlights
• About 1 in 5 Canadian adults suffers with chronic pain of
at least moderate intensity.
• Many strange and unusual pain symptoms once
thought to be caused by psychopathology can now be
explained by peripheral and central neurophysiological
mechanisms that have gone awry.
• DSM-5 SSD with predominant pain replaces DSM-IV-TR
pain disorder, but, because the diagnostic criteria for
SSD are overly inclusive, many medical patients with
significant symptoms of emotional distress will receive
an inappropriate psychiatric diagnosis.
Pain has survival value. It serves as a warning that allis not well, frequently signalling injury or disease. 
It encourages us to seek medical help, contributes to the 
healing process by promoting rest and recovery, and lets 
us know, by its absence, when to resume activities. Pain 
reminds us of past harmful events and situations, it teaches 
us what to avoid in the future, and motivates us to act to 
terminate it. People born without the capacity to feel pain 
often do not live beyond childhood because they fail to 
appreciate the implications of injury and disease.1 These 
protective functions concern acute pain, a relatively short, 
time-limited experience that abates when the injury heals or 
the disease is cured.
However, there is another kind of pain—chronic pain or 
persistent pain—that serves no adaptive purpose. When 
chronic pain is severe and intractable, it lodges itself in 
the core of the person and causes distress and suffering. 
Chronic pain ruins marriages and families. It leads to job 
loss and other financial problems, social isolation, worry, 
anxiety, depression, and, at times, suicide. The IASP defines 
pain as “an unpleasant sensory and emotional experience 
associated with actual or potential tissue damage, or 
described in terms of such damage.”2, p 210 In contrast, we do 
not have a generally agreed on definition of chronic pain. 
Chronic pain was traditionally defined by the length of time 
that pain persists,3 but a time-based approach ignores many 
other important features. Recent conceptualizations have 
introduced a more nuanced approach.2 The IASP currently 
defines chronic pain variously as “pain without apparent 
biological value,” pain “that has persisted beyond the 
normal tissue healing time . . . as determined by common 
medical experience,” and (or) as “a persistent pain that is 
not amenable, as a rule, to treatments based upon specific 
remedies.”2, p xii But even these refinements do not capture all 
the varieties of persistent pain, and an acceptable definition 
continues to elude us. For example, some chronic pain 
conditions, such as rheumatoid arthritis, will likely never 
heal, and others, such as migraine headaches, remit (that 
is, heal) and then recur.2 Notwithstanding the challenges 
associated with defining chronic pain and the problems 
with a solely time-based definition, for research purposes, 
chronic nonmalignant pain is typically defined as pain that 
persists for longer than 6 months.4–6
From a neurobiological perspective, pain involves 
nociceptive, inflammatory, and (or) neuropathic 
components.7 Pain arising from nociceptive afferent input is 
the first stage of an “early-warning physiological protective 
system”7, p 3742 designed to minimize contact with tissue-
damaging and other noxious stimuli. It involves activation 
of high-threshold receptors (nociceptors) on sensory 
neurons located in skin, muscle, and viscera. Pain due to 
inflammatory inputs is usually caused by tissue-damaging 
stimuli, such as injury, trauma, and surgery. Tissue damage 
activates a cascade of neuromolecular immune responses 
that results in swelling and tenderness, which as noted 
above, encourages rest and promotes recovery. Nociceptive 
and inflammatory pains are adaptive and protective; they 
typically comprise what is referred to as acute pain in that 
they are time-limited and resolve when the noxious stimulus 
has been removed or healing occurs.
In contrast, pain of neuropathic origin, which arises 
from direct lesion or damage to somatosensory system, 
is considered pathological.8 Neuropathic pain involves 
profound alterations in the normal peripheral and central 
neural processing of afferent input. As a consequence 
of injury or disease, nociceptive neurons change their 
response properties; they may display spontaneous activity, 
an increase in responsiveness, and a reduction in activation 
threshold to normal and subthreshold inputs (Table 1).9,10 
Pain of neuropathic origin is often described as burning, 
aching, and electric shock-like in quality. It is typically 
more severe and less responsive to conventional treatments 
than are nociceptive and inflammatory pain. Pathological 
pain with similar features also occurs in people who have 
not sustained an injury or who have no discernable disease, 
such as in fibromyalgia, irritable bowel syndrome, and 
tension headaches.8,10 Regardless of the presence or absence 
of an identifiable etiological trigger, when neuroplasticity 
goes awry in certain at-risk people, the pain becomes the 
disease.7,11,12
Recent epidemiologic studies reveal surprisingly high 
prevalence estimates for chronic pain. Using the World 
Mental Health version of the World Health Organization 
CIDI, the 12-month prevalence of chronic pain was 
found to be about 37% in developed countries and 41% 
in developing countries.13 When only moderate-to-severe 
pain is considered, lifetime prevalence rates drop to about 
25% of the general population.14 These data are consistent 
with 3 Canadian surveys showing a prevalence rate for 
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chronic noncancer pain between 19% and 29%, with 
most respondents reporting pain of moderate to severe 
intensity.5,15,16 Chronic pain prevalence increases with 
age, is greater among females than males, and among 
people with lower, compared with higher, socioeconomic 
status.5,13,17,18 Common causes of chronic noncancer pain 
include traumatic injury, surgery, and arthritis.5,17,19 The 
most frequent body locations for chronic pain include the 
low back, knee joints, head, and neck.5,6
Comorbidity Between Chronic Pain and 
the Mood and Anxiety Disorders
Chronic pain is highly comorbid with anxiety and 
depression. Space limitations preclude a thorough review. 
Two recent, large-scale, population-based surveys 
examined the comorbidity between chronic neck and (or) 
back pain and the DSM-IV mood and anxiety disorders.20,21 
Both surveys used the third version of the CIDI to assess 
mood and anxiety disorders as well as interviews to 
determine the 12-month prevalence of comorbid neck and 
(or) back pain. Von Korff et al21 surveyed 5692 community-
dwelling people in the United States. Demyttenaere et al20 
conducted a cross-national survey of 85 088 community-
dwelling people in 18 countries around the world. The ORs 
(adjusted for age, sex, race and [or] ethnicity, and education) 
associated with having comorbid neck and (or) back pain 
and any anxiety disorder or major depression relative to 
neck and (or) back pain alone (that is, the added risk of 
having a mental disorder in people with neck and [or] back 
pain) for the 2 studies were remarkably similar.
Depression
In the US-based study,21 the 12-month prevalence of 
comorbid chronic pain and any mood disorder was 17.5% 
(SE [standard error] 1.1), with major depression comprising 
the most frequent comorbid mood disorder (12.6%, SE 
0.07). ORs for any mood disorder ranged from 2.5 to 
3.2, with an OR of 2.5 for major depression. In the cross-
national study,20 the 12-month prevalence of comorbid 
chronic pain and major depression ranged from 2.5% to 
15.7%, with ORs greater than zero in 16 out of 18 of the 
countries and a pooled OR of 2.3 (95% CI 2.1 to 2.5). The 
STOP-PAIN Project evaluated the burden of chronic pain in 
728 people waiting for treatment at 1 of 8 university-based 
multidisciplinary pain treatment facilities in Canada.22 
Eighty-two per cent endorsed symptoms of depression (as 
measured by the Beck Depression Inventory), with about 
56% reporting moderate to extremely severe levels and 
34.6% reporting suicidal ideation.
Anxiety
ORs ranged from 1.5 (95% CI 0.9 to 2.4) for agoraphobia 
to 2.6  (95% CI 2.1 to 3.3) for PTSD, with a pooled OR 
of 2.3  (95% CI 1.9 to 2.7) for any anxiety disorder in the 
US-based study21 and pooled across countries from 1.9 
(95% CI 1.7 to 2.2) for social phobia to 2.7 (95% CI 2.4 
to 3.1) for generalized anxiety disorder with a pooled OR 
of 2.2 (95% CI 2.1 to 2.4) for any anxiety disorder for the 
cross-national study.20 It is notable that, with the exception 
of agoraphobia without panic disorder,21 all of the anxiety 
disorders in both surveys were significantly more likely 
to occur in people with neck and (or) back pain than in 
people without. Moreover, the highest ORs were found for 
generalized anxiety disorder (OR 2.6; 95% CI 2.0 to 3.521 
and OR 2.7; 95% CI 2.4 to 3.120) and PTSD (OR 2.614; 
95% CI 2.2 to 3.020 and OR 2.6; 95% CI 2.1 to 3.321). The 
substantial overlap in comorbidity and symptomatology 
between the anxiety disorders and chronic pain has been 
documented both when examining the presence of anxiety 
disorders in people with chronic pain and the presence of 
chronic pain in people with anxiety (mainly PTSD).23–25 
Interested readers are referred to recent reviews describing 
the theoretical models and mechanisms proposed to underlie 
the high comorbidity between chronic pain and the anxiety 
disorders.23–25
Chronic Pain and Psychopathology
There are many pains whose cause is not known. If 
a diligent search has been made in the periphery and 
no cause is found, we have seen that clinicians act as 
though there was only one alternative. They blame 
faulty thinking, which for many classically-thinking 
doctors is the same thing as saying that there is no 
cause and even no disease. They ignore a century’s 
work on disorders of the spinal cord and brainstem 
and target the mind. . . . These are the doctors who 
repeat again and again to a Second World War 
amputee in pain that there is nothing wrong with 
him and that it is all in his head.26, p 107
Pains that do not conform to present-day anatomical and 
neurophysiological knowledge are often attributed to 
psychopathology. This view of medically unexplained 
pain persists, notwithstanding evidence to the contrary. 
Psychological dysfunction has been proposed to cause 
phantom limb pain,27 dyspareunia,28 orofacial pain,29,30 
fibromyalgia,31 pelvic pain,32 and a host of others, including 
abdominal pain, chest pain, and headache.33 However, the 
complexity of the pain transmission circuitry means that many 
pains that are currently poorly understood will ultimately 
be explained without resorting to a psychopathological 
etiology.10 Pain that is nonanatomical in distribution, spread 
of pain to noninjured territory, pain that is said to be out of 
proportion to the degree of injury, and pain in the absence of 
injury have all, at one time or another, been used as evidence 
to support the idea that psychological disturbance underlies 
the pain. Notably, each of these features once thought to 
be caused by psychopathology can now be explained by 
peripheral and central neurophysiological mechanisms that 
have gone awry (Table 1).29,34
Spontaneous pain, pain from a stimulus, such as gentle 
touch, that does not normally provoke pain (allodynia), 
and increased pain from a stimulus that normally provokes 
pain (hyperalgesia) are perceptual correlates of well-
documented mechanisms of central sensitization that 
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develop after injury to the peripheral or CNS.9,10,35 There is 
also a less-well-known body of literature on the expression 
of novel receptive fields36,37 and the expansion of existing 
receptive fields38,39 in response to alterations in the flow of 
afferent input. Further, previously undocumented cross-
system, viscero–visceral interactions within the CNS have 
recently been described among women with chronic pelvic 
pain.40 This literature provides a neurophysiological basis 
for clinical observations in humans that pain may occur in 
the absence a known trigger, spread to distant, previously 
nonpainful, and otherwise healthy body regions,9,40 as well 
as a rationale for why a local intervention applied to one 
body region may relieve pain at another.40,41
Recent data linking the immune system and the CNS have 
provided an explanation for another medically unexplained 
pain problem. Mirror-image pain or allochiria has puzzled 
clinicians and basic scientists ever since it was first 
documented in the late-1800s.42 Injury to one side of the 
body is experienced as pain at the site of injury as well as 
at the contralateral, mirror-image point.43,44 Recent animal 
studies show induction of a sciatic inflammatory neuritis 
by peri-sciatic microinjection of immune system activators 
results in both an ipsilateral hyperalgesia and hyperalgesia 
at the mirror-image point on the opposite side in the territory 
of the contralateral healthy sciatic nerve.45 Moreover, 
both the ipsilateral and contralateral hyperalgesia are 
prevented or reversed by intrathecal injection of various 
proinflammatory cytokine antagonists.46
Mirror-image pain is likely not a unitary phenomenon and 
other nonimmune mechanisms may also be involved.47 
For example, recent human48,49 and animal evidence50 
point to a potential combination of central and peripheral 
contributions to mirror-image pain as nerve injury to 1 side 
of the body has been shown to result in a 50% reduction 
in the innervation of the territory of the same nerve on the 
opposite side of the body in uninjured skin.50 Interestingly, 
while documented contralateral neurite loss can occur 
in the absence of contralateral pain or hyperalgesia, pain 
intensity at the site of the injury correlates significantly 
with the extent of contralateral neurite loss.49 This raises 
the intriguing possibility that the intensity of pain at the 
site of an injury may be facilitated by contralateral neurite 
loss induced by the ipsilateral injury50—a situation that 
most clinicians would never have imagined possible. More 
recently, tactile allochiria (for example, touch applied to a 
finger on the right hand was experienced only as pain in 
the corresponding left finger) occurred in patients with 
complex regional pain syndrome—type I who also showed 
evidence of possible parietal lobe dysfunction.48
Taken together, these novel mechanisms explain some of 
the most puzzling pain symptoms. But there remain many 
other pains that defy present-day understanding. This should 
keep us mindful that emotional distress and psychological 
disturbance in our patients are not the cause of the pain. 
Attributing pain to a psychological disturbance is damaging 
to the patient and provider alike. It pollutes the therapeutic 
relationship by introducing an element of mutual distrust as 
well as implicit, if not explicit, blame. It is demoralizing to 
the patient who feels at fault, disbelieved, and alone.
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, Fifth Edition, and Chronic Pain
The golden rule: an underlying medical illness or 
medication side effect has to be ruled out before 
ever deciding that someone’s symptoms are caused 
by mental disorder. . . . There are serious risks 
attached to over-psychologizing somatic symptoms 
and mislabeling the normal reactions to being 
sick − especially when the judgments are based on 
vague wording that can’t possibly lead to reliable 
diagnosis. DSM-5 as it now stands will add to the 
suffering of those already burdened with all the 
cares of having a medical illness.51, p 484 
Table 1  Mechanisms of dorsal horn neuronal central sensitization and other physiological findings associated 
with pathological pain states showing possible associated experiences and (or) symptoms that in the past were 
medically unexplained and contributed to the misdiagnosis of chronic pain patients as having mental illness (for 
example, hysteria, hypochondriasis, malingering, pain-prone, psychogenic pain disorder, somatization)
Physiological mechanism Experience (symptom)
Development of and (or) increase in spontaneous neural activity9 Stimulus-independent pain (spontaneous pain) 
Reduction in neural threshold for activation9 Pain in response to a stimulus that does not normally produce 
pain (allodynia)
Increased neural response to repeated, fixed-intensity, 
C-fibre strength stimulus72
Increased pain from a stimulus that normally provokes pain 
(hyperalgesia)
Enlargement of neuronal receptive fields9 Spread of pain to adjacent, undamaged tissue (secondary 
hyperalgesia)
Injury-induced unmasking of previously ineffective synaptic 
connections37
Spread of pain to distant body regions (remote hyperalgesia)
Cross-system, viscero–visceral interactions within the central 
nervous system40
Spread of pain to distant body regions (remote hyperalgesia)
Ipsilateral injury-induced, contralateral peripheral neurite loss49 Mirror-image pain (allochiria)
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The hard-fought gains to have pain disorder expunged 
from the DSM-IV52 have come at the expense of an overly 
inclusive and unreliable new DSM-553 disorder termed 
SSD. Nevertheless, that DSM-5 does not include a pain-
specific disorder (for example, psychogenic pain disorder,54 
somatoform pain disorder,55 and pain disorder52), as in 
past editions of the DSM, is a welcomed advance (see 
Merskey56,57 for reviews on the history of DSM pain and 
somatoform diagnoses).
SSD is a single diagnostic entity that replaces 3 of the 
DSM-IV52 somatoform disorders (somatization disorder, 
pain disorder, and undifferentiated somatoform disorder, 
and in some cases hypochondriasis). Table 2 lists the 
diagnostic criteria for SSD, which include 1 or more 
physical symptoms lasting 6 months or longer that are 
associated with excessive thoughts, feelings, or behaviours. 
Three specifiers describe the nature (with predominant 
pain), duration (persistent, if longer than 6 months), and 
severity (mild, moderate, or severe) of the symptoms. Brief 
SSD is diagnosed under other specified somatic symptom 
and related disorder when the duration of symptoms is less 
than 6 months. The SSD specifier, persistent, indicating 
a duration greater than 6 months appears to be redundant 
and unnecessary, as SSD is diagnosed only at 6 months and 
brief SSD is diagnosed when the symptoms have persisted 
for less than 6 months.
DSM-IV pain disorder was rightly criticized on 2 counts: 
The questionable importance of medically unexplained 
pain58,59 in pain disorder associated with psychological 
factors; and, the lack of a definition of psychological factors 
or a description of when they are of sufficient importance 
or magnitude to play a role in the pain experience in the 
presence of a general medical condition made it a diagnosis 
of exclusion.59,60 The DSM-5 SSD represents an advance 
over DSM-IV pain disorder with the removal of the 
requirement that the symptoms be medically unexplained 
and the addition of subjective distress as diagnostic of SSD, 
but it has ignored the sage advice that this is a diagnosis that 
should rarely be made.56
Notwithstanding these improvements, 2 major criticisms 
have been levelled against the DSM-5: diagnostic inflation 
and inadequate field testing.61 Both appear to apply to the 
new diagnostic category of SSD. The main criticism of SSD 
is the high probability of misdiagnosing a medical illness, 
including chronic pain conditions, as a mental illness.61–63 
Further, the conditions that qualify for a diagnosis of SSD 
are extremely variable. They include a highly mixed group 
of patients with medically unexplained symptoms, medical 
patients with significant symptoms of emotional distress, 
patients with typical chronic pain conditions (for example, 
low-back pain, fibromyalgia, rheumatoid arthritis) and 
patients with health-related anxiety.64 According to 
Frances,62 15% of cancer patients, 15% of patients with 
heart disease, and 25% of patients with irritable bowel 
syndrome and chronic widespread pain would qualify for 
a diagnosis of SSD. Moreover, the false-positive rate in the 
general population would approach 7%.
DSM-5 field testing in the United States and Canada showed 
a test–retest kappa coefficient of 0.61 (95% CI 0.40 to 0.77) 
for complex SSD (revised), as well as a prevalence for 
complex SSD (revised) of 0.08 (95% CI 0.06 to 0.11) and 
a corresponding DSM-IV prevalence of 0.1 for somatoform 
disorder (excluding conversion and body dysmorphic 
disorders).65 However, note that in the absence of more data 
Table 2  DSM-5 diagnostic criteria for somatic symptom disorder
A. One or more somatic symptoms that are distressing or result in significant disruption of daily life.
B. Excessive thoughts, feelings, or behavio[u]rs related to the somatic symptoms or associated health concerns as manifested 
by at least one of the following:
1. Disproportionate and persistent thoughts about the seriousness of one’s symptoms.
2. Persistently high level of anxiety about health or symptoms.
3. Excessive time and energy devoted to these symptoms or health concerns.
C. Although any one somatic symptom may not be continuously present, the state of being symptomatic is persistent  
(typically more than 6 months).
Specify if:
With predominant pain (previously pain disorder): This specifier is for individuals whose somatic symptoms predominantly 
involve pain.
Specify if:
Persistent: A persistent course is characterized by severe symptoms, marked by impairment, and long duration  
(more than 6 months).
Specify current severity:
Mild:  Only one of the symptoms specified in Criterion B is fulfilled.
Moderate:  Two or more of the symptoms specified in Criterion B are fulfilled.
Severe: Two or more of the symptoms specified in Criterion B are fulfilled, plus there are multiple somatic complaints 
(or one very severe symptom).
Reproduced, with permission, from the American Psychiatric Association.53, p 311
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on the validity of SSD, even a moderately high reliability 
coefficient is not very meaningful. It is also not clear how the 
diagnostic criteria for complex SSD (revised), as described 
in the field testing,65,66 map onto those that now appear in 
the DSM-5 under SSD. Moreover, there is no mention of 
whether any of the patients in the field trial sample actually 
had chronic pain conditions (compared with other body 
system symptoms). Further, although a stated aim of SSD 
was to simplify and clarify the diagnostic procedure for 
use in primary care, field testing did not include primary 
care settings or physicians.65 Finally, sample size was 
inadequate. Considering that field testing usually produces 
higher reliability estimates than exist in clinical practice,61 
the data on reliability seem unrealistically high for what 
is an extremely broad range of patients who qualify for 
a diagnosis of SSD. A subsequent field trial in routine 
mental health clinical practice settings reported the DSM-5 
approach to diagnosis was feasible, useful, and acceptable 
to clinicians and patients but the sample size diagnosed 
with SSD was extremely small.67
Frances and Chapman51 list 10 negative consequences 
of the new DSM-5 SSD diagnostic category, including 
the following that relate specifically to chronic pain 
conditions: stigma; overlooked diagnoses owing to 
a failure to investigate new or worsening somatic 
symptoms; increased risk of a parent, with a child who 
has a chronic illness, being diagnosed with SSD, leading 
to inappropriate claims of parental overinvolvement or of 
encouraging the child’s sick role behaviour; increased risk 
of receiving inappropriate psychotropic medications; and 
falling prey to the gender trap68 by further marginalizing 
women in the health care system as they present with 
physical symptoms such as persistent pain more frequently 
than do men. This is supported by a comparison of DSM-5 
SSD and DSM-IV somatoform disorders assessed in the 
same group of patients showing that a significantly greater 
proportion of women than men received the former but not 
the latter diagnosis.69
Several authors have proposed modified diagnostic criteria 
to reduce the likelihood of diagnostic inflation and the 
misdiagnosis of medical illness as mental illness.62,64,70 Table 3 
contains a set of revised diagnostic criteria recommended 
by Frances.71 These criteria were developed to establish 
an appropriate balance between sensitivity and specificity, 
and to reduce the likelihood of false-positive diagnoses. 
However, given the problems with current diagnostic 
criteria for SSD, noted above, alternative diagnoses have 
been suggested as appropriate for people with chronic pain; 
including, psychological factors affecting other medical 
conditions70 and adjustment disorder.70,71 The distinction 
between SSD and psychological factors affecting other 
medical conditions is not clear-cut, especially for people 
with chronic pain conditions, as both involve a diagnosable 
medical condition. For SSD, the emphasis is said to be on 
“maladaptive thoughts, feelings and behavior,” whereas for 
psychological factors affecting other medical conditions 
the emphasis in on “the exacerbation of the medical 
condition.”53, p 324 This distinction seems arbitrary for people 
with chronic pain, as pain is known to produce worry and 
worry is known to exacerbate pain. Until the criteria for 
SSD are appropriately revised, adjustment disorder is a 
“safer and more accurate” diagnosis when one is needed 
for someone who is “medically ill or otherwise troubled by 
puzzling symptoms”71, p 531 Chronic pain is highly comorbid 
with anxiety and depression
Summary and Conclusions
Acute pain is protective in the short term when it signals tissue 
damage or disease via nociceptive and inflammatory inputs, 
but chronic pathological pain has no adaptive value. Chronic 
pain is highly prevalent worldwide and highly comorbid 
with anxiety and depression. It is associated with substantial 
Table 3  Recommended71 revised DSM-5 diagnostic criteria for somatic symptom disorder
Criteria A, B, C, D, E, F, and G must all be fulfilled to make the diagnosis:
D. One or more prominent physical symptoms.
E. Excessive and maladaptive thoughts, feelings, and behavio[u]rs related to the physical symptoms. All three [3] of the 
following must be present:
1. clearly disproportionate and intrusive worries about the seriousness of the symptoms,
2. extreme anxiety about the symptoms, and
3. excessive time and energy devoted to the symptoms or health concerns.
F. The concerns have persisted at a clearly problematic and maladaptive level for at least 6 months.
G.  The excessive concerns about physical symptoms are pervasive and cause significant disruption and impairment in daily 
life.
H. If a diagnosed medical condition is present, the thoughts, feelings, and behavio[u]rs are grossly in excess of what would be 
expected, given the nature of the medical condition.
I. If no medical diagnosis has been made, a thorough medical workup has been performed to rule out possible causes and is 
repeated at suitable intervals to uncover medical conditions that may declare themselves with the passage of time.
J. The physical symptom or concern it is not better accounted for by another mental disorder (e.g. [for example], anxiety, 
depressive, or psychotic disorder).
Reproduced, with permission, from Frances.71
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financial, occupational, psychological, and social burden. 
Pain that is not readily explained medically has frequently 
been attributed to psychopathology, largely because of 
puzzling and bizarre symptoms, but recent basic science 
findings have provided a neurophysiological basis for many 
of these symptoms. These advances in our understanding 
of pain mechanisms have had parallel effects in psychiatry 
where, for the first time in more than 30 years, the most recent 
edition of the DSM no longer includes a pain-specific mental 
disorder. DSM-5 SSD with predominant pain replaces DSM-
IV pain disorder but it is not recommended for people with 
chronic pain, because it lacks validity, and is overly inclusive 
and stigmatizing. Instead, adjustment disorder remains the 
most appropriate, accurate, and acceptable diagnosis for 
people who are overly concerned about their pain.
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